Abstract. This paper describes a possible way to improve computer security by implementing a program which implements the following three features related to a weak notion of artificial consciousness: (partial) self-monitoring, ability to compute the truth of quantifier-free propositions and the ability to communicate with the user. The integrity of the program could be enhanced by using a trusted computing approach, that is to say a hardware module that is at the root of a chain of trust. This paper outlines a possible approach but does not refer to an implementation (which would need further work), but the author believes that an implementation using current processors, a debugger, a monitoring program and a trusted processing module is currently possible.
Introduction
It is plausible to believe that the minimum condition that distinguishes an artificially conscious computer from one that is not conscious is the ability to self-monitor (an idea that is evident in the postscript to [Dennett84] , and is explored in, for example, [Sloman07] ). There are many other approaches to artificial consciousness, from flat out denial of its possibility (usually based on a belief in a fundamentally qualitative type of existence, qualia, which inanimate things do not possess), through the views that consciousness is only to be associated with biological systems, that consciousness must be associated with language, that a conscious being must have an internal representation of itself, that consciousness is an emergent property of sufficiently complex systems, to the view above that consciousness is a function of the ability to self-refer or self-monitor and the even stronger view that consciousness is a property of computations. [Chella07] contains a range of reasonably current views on artificial consciousness and [Reggia13] and [Gamez08] are recent surveys. This paper does not provide a critique of various views of artificial consciousness, but instead advocates that three criteria should be tested empirically to investigate their adequacy for artificial consciousness in order to establish a possibly weak notion of artificial consciousness which can be used to improve the security of computer systems.
The three criteria are:
• Self-monitoring • Ability to make judgements • Ability to communicate, i.e. at minimum respond with "yes" and "no" answers to external questions To be clear, these criteria are not seen as an anything more than framing an hypothesis, which will need help from techniques in machine learning, expert systems and machine visual representation in order to be tested. It may be that an autonomous agent approach with consciousness as the broker between the activities of the agents (see for example the LIDA parallel processing model of S. Franklin, for example [Franklin, BaarsFranklin09, FranklinGraessner99] , or the neural network agents model of M. Shanahan, see [Shanahan06, ConnorShanahan10] , or the neural network state machine approach of I. Aleksander (see [Aleksander97] ) may produce machines which pass the test of consciousness as expressed by the three criteria above. There is merit in the view that an artificially conscious entity does need representations of objects in the world around us to make judgments that are decidable by others (see Section 4), but in this paper it is argued that judgements about the state 1 of an entity's own registers and memory has value for the purpose of maintaining security.
In this paper the focus will be on a computer as the artificially conscious entity and on the security implications of artificial consciousness, which exist even for a weak notion of self-monitoring. Section 2 discusses how far self-monitoring can be achieved. Section 4 explains why the ability to make judgements and the ability to communicate are reasonable criteria for artificial consciousness and how judgements and communications should be characterized. Sections 3 and 5 discuss the implications for security of self-monitoring, judgment and communications of an artificially conscious program and connections to the trusted computed initiative implemented in recent computing platforms. In summary then, the notions of communications, self-monitoring and judgement for a computer are explored and their implications for improved security of computer systems are considered.
Self-monitoring
Self-monitoring is not the same as self-representation but does imply some kind of self-awareness. Self-representation as a notion implies that a computer program has a model of the self which it uses to validate references in judgements about actions made by the self, but self-monitoring on the other hand only requires that the program can check (some of) its own activities. Although self-representation is not explicitly pursued in this paper, it may have utility as an aspect of a consciousness because it is reasonable to suppose that the self can also be represented to the self. However, self-monitoring is taken to be the more fundamental notion, as there are limits to how faithful a representation of self can be (see the comments below about the limits of self-monitoring). To be more precise about self-monitoring, a computer program self-monitors if it is capable of checking the values of all the registers or variables that it uses and the instruction that the program is currently executing and the history of the state of the program (that is, the register values and instructions executed, indexed by time). A computer process self-monitors if it self-monitors as a computer program and it is able to monitor the state of any interrupt sent to it by another process.
It is possible for a program or a process to self-monitor (if it has not crashed) 2 because the self-monitoring function is very similar to what a debugger or instrumentation program does. Strictly, a debugger is a program which enables any 1 In this paper, state will refer to the values of all registers and the current instruction executed at a specific time.
2 A process has crashed if the program has not terminated and its execution cycles through a sequence of states.
other program to be monitored without changing its computation steps or the values of its variables; and it is of course true there will be registers and values whose current values cannot be read, i.e. those registers which are used to check the values of registers of the instrumented program. Recent approaches to instrumenting a program by dynamically patching its execution path are given at [Feiner12, Bungale07, Chachmon16] . In the present context such a limitation is acceptable for two reasons. Firstly, self-monitoring is useful insofar as it concerns monitoring the status of processes spawned by a given process, for example, to check if the processes have crashed or are stuck in an endless loop, rather than trying to determine whether the process itself is stuck in an endless loop (which is in general is unsolvable because it is equivalent to the halting problem 3 ). Secondly, it is possible to check the value of all registers and the currently executing instruction with a time delay, as previously executed instructions and register values can be archived. It is also possible for the values of the internal state of a process to be monitored by a separate process which can set a flag in one registers used by the first process if the first process is behaving abnormally, with the limitation that the first process cannot reciprocally monitor the monitoring processing (which would be equivalent to self-monitoring). So, for practical purposes programs and processes can self-monitor. More theoretically, it is unreasonable to expect a monitoring interface to expose everything about the monitoring program. Humans rely on indirect reports from sensors, whereas an artificially conscious computer could expose far more of its hardware state as well as the states of its processes.
The implications of a self-monitoring program are that the operating system (which is a management program after all) can monitor all the programs and processes that the operating system manages and can intervene if they crash, do not respond to interrupts, or just behave abnormally (take up a lot of memory or get stuck in a loop with no change in the value of the variables in the loop condition).
Security implications of self-monitoring
If it is possible to tell whether a process is behaving abnormally, it is plausible to believe that the operating system can check whether a process or program other than itself is operating insecurely. Of course security is difficult to define in general because security is relative to a set of specific security policies 4 , but in terms of vulnerabilities not envisaged by the programmer, security means that the variables have the values expected and that no memory structures used in the management of program execution are modified other than by the operating system. A value of a variable may be said to be expected if the program assigns data types to variables and the value is in the range associated with the data type. In the case where the operating system instruments every program by assigning data types to all variables, checks whether all values of the variables are expected, and manages all access to memory structures, it can be seen that a self-monitoring operating system could identify programs which are operating insecurely and could instrument them in such a way that evidence could be provided to a system administrator so that the insecure program could be closed down.
In fact, we can even be bolder in our claims about what a self-monitoring operating system could monitor. It could monitor attempts to modify operating system functions and libraries but, in general, not attempted changes to instrumentation of those functions. It would be only be possible to address the risk of unauthorized modification of the operating system if there was a hierarchy of trust. If the operating system is trustworthy then it could assign a trustworthiness rating to programs based on the number of security reports raised. It would be particularly useful to combine this approach with a trusted computing approach 5 which uses hardware separation (i.e. trusted processing modules) to verify the integrity of the operating system, to provide a chain of trust of programs run on the system, and to manage (via a virtualization layer) the execution of any programs (whether standard user programs or high privilege programs such as kernel loadable modules). The trusted computing module would prevent programs from having an impact if they execute insecure code and the security verification will check the trustworthiness of the program.
Judgement and communication as criteria of artificial consciousness
An artificial consciousness that could make judgements for itself would reduce the decision-making burden on the user. The practical reason for including judgements in the criteria for consciousness is that it seems impossible to make decisions about what you are monitoring without the ability to make judgements. Thanks to a line of logicians from G. Frege (see [Frege1884] ) 6 onwards, we understand what it is to make a judgement about a set of concepts and objects. That is, we can in principle decide (i.e. compute the truth or falsehood of) a statement that does not contain unbounded logical quantifiers (such as "for all" or "there exists") 7 but may contain logical operators such as "and", "or", "not" and "implies". A judgment is then a computable function (that is, a computation) from properties (or predicates) and objects into the set that contains "true" and "false". To be clear, we can apply a program to a (natural number) code of a property that could apply to a set of (codes of) input objects, and compute whether the property applies to a given set of objects or not. For example, if we wish to decide where natural number c satisfies the natural number relation a ≤ x ≤ b we could code a ≤ x ≤ b as ⌈a ≤ x ≤ b⌉ using a computable coding ⌈⌉ and then substitute c for x in ⌈a ≤ x ≤ b⌉ and decide the truth of ⌈a ≤ c ≤ b⌉ by means of a computable function. Of course, the types of judgement that a computer can make will concern objective states of affairs that it can represent, such as whether a process is or is not responding to interrupts (in a certain timescale), but not be about wishes or intentions.
It is worth stressing that the operating systems should make judgements about all programs that the operating system manages (at least in the form of recommendations to an administrator) on a frequent basis in terms of program health (where they are caught in an endless loop or require too much system resources to run), program security (against security policies and needing to pass vulnerability checks) and program safety (against safety policies and needing to pass vulnerability checks). The idea is that the operating system would run through all the tasks it needs to perforn and compute each as a judgment, recording the results of the judgements in a log.
It is also worth noting that not all properties are computably decidable 8 and some are not practically computably decidable (because any computation has a long runtime), but it is nevertheless possible to decide whether for example a set of bits (a pixel) represents the colour blue, whether a certain shape could represent a cat, or whether indeed a certain process has not responded to an interrupt.
9 If we allow deep learning neural networks
10
, it is possible to represent concepts of differing levels of abstraction and to classify objects under those concepts. In order to decide properties and make judgements, the artificially conscious program will need to write and run programs of its own, i.e. spawn processes. In order to make judgements about propositions that are not decidable but which are theorems of axiom systems, we might want to allow the artificial consciousness to deduce theorems from (codes of) axioms using inference rules, understand the axioms by verifying that the axioms have a model 11 , and even to be able to propose new axioms by producing models which satisfy those axioms (perhaps by using neural networks to classify propositions as "theorems" or not). However, even without making the artificially conscious program into a logician or a data scientist, the value of being able to make judgments is considerable in terms of the ability of the artificial consciousness to enforce security and safety policies and to improve clarity and efficiency of interacting with the operating system for the user.
The reason why a program that can make judgements results in greater clarity for the user is that the computations of decidable propositions will form a justification of the decisions that the program recommends. This approach will also increase efficiency for the user because the operating system can make recommendations to the user or take actions in a way that does not cause the user to try to 8 In general arithmetical predicates containing any unbounded natural number quantifiers are not decidable by means of a computation unless they have the specific form noted in Footnote 7.
9 These examples are deliberately taken mainly from machine learning of visual representations because that area provides a rich source of decidable judgements. Speech analytics is another such area, as is of course the content of the computer's own registers. 10 Layers in convolutional neural networks, where the convolution operation picks out features, naturally form a hierarchy of increasing abstraction. 11 Ideally we would want to show that the axioms are true in a particular model of the axioms,
because truth in some model shows the consistency of the axioms. In order to build models computable representations of arbitrary elements and defined functions/predicates of the model will be needed. [Hodges85] is a very readable account of model theory, using games with finite rule sets to build models.
guess at the cause of messages from the operating system.
The ability to communicate is included as a criterion of artificial consciousness as a minimum condition for testing artificial consciousness, otherwise an external user will have to monitor its state directly. An artificially conscious program needs to communicate with the programs that it monitors, and operating systems are expected to report to users on the the status of programs that are running and to implement the users' commands. The ability to communicate interactively and faithfully would be desirable. For these reasons, the ability to communicate to other programs and to users is essential. At minimum that communication could be "yes" or "no" (i.e. one bit of information), although in practice data and functions of all types could be passed through the program's interface, including validation of the accuracy of the information communicated.
Security implications of judgement and communications
The ability to form judgements could be used to prevent a user making mistakes and in coming to evidence-based decisions. When combined with the trusted computing techniques noted in connection with self-monitoring, the artificially conscious program would have some evidence for the integrity of its own functioning and for the soundness of its own judgements. The ability to communicate on the other hand could introduce vulnerabilities into the program if the types and validity of the value of program inputs are not checked, and the integrity of the messages communicated would need to be assured (by cryptographic means for example). Communication is necessary for the worth of the artificially conscious program to be realized in terms of helping a user make decisions and to report back information. In any case vulnerabilities in programs through specially crafted inputs are not new for any operating system, nor is the need for integrity checking of communications. Trusted computing could also provide integrity checking of communications.
Conclusions
In this paper an approach to artificial consciousness is suggested which is sufficient for increasing the security of operating systems, namely communications, judgments and self-monitoring. It is also suggested that self-monitoring brings significant security benefits in supporting the termination of programs which do not respond to interrupts or otherwise exhibit unusual behaviour, that communications is necessary for testing the functioning of an artificially conscious program, and that the ability to make judgements is useful for user decision-support.
